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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, an elderly Mexican fisherman by name of Papa
Diez was watching an American prospector friend giving classes
in prospecting to the young children of the Bahia de Los
Angeles area of Baj a California. "You are wasting your time
and their time, Herman, II the fisherman said. "None of them
will be prospectors when they grow up; they are going to make
their living from the sea. II Two years later, just before he
died, the fisherman said to his friend, "I was wrong; the
classes are a good idea, for none of the children will be able
to make a living from the sea in the future II (McGettigan ,
1994) .
It is unfortunate that the Mexican Secretaria de Pescas
(Department of Fisheries), Secretaria de Tourismo (Department
of Tourism) and Sedesol (Department of Ecology) d i.dn I t have
the same vision. Today, in a battle of an embittered economy
chasing scarce pesos and a marine environment that many say is
dead and unsalvageable , the state of most Mexican fisheries
has been sacrificed as Mexico continues to decimate every
level of the marine food chain. The decline of most Mexican
fisheries has occurred so rapidly that few Mexicans and
Americans alike fully appreciate the loss . The major focus of
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this paper will examine the false impression that Mexico is
engaging in marine conservation; in reality, its conservation
efforts are responses to after-the-fact actions brought on by
world critics and as a vehicle to pacify conservationists. The
Mexican government can pass a law but lacks the resources to
administer and enforce the law and subsequently manage its
fisheries in an effective manner.
Rather than survey the state of every fishery found in
Mexican waters, this paper will examine only four fisheries
because of their unique economic , political and ecologic
impact, and how the Mexican government allowed their demise.
These fisheries are California gray whale, Pacific manta, sea
turtle, and totoaba. Although other species may be threatened
or have a declining population, the aforementioned group has a
major influence not only on Mexico's economy but its role as a
participant in world marine conservation. The Mexican
government has sadly sacrificed these species at the expense
of strengthening their economy, or in some cases, attempting
to convince their American counterparts that they are engaged
in marine conservation in order to implement the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Each of these fisheries
2
has declined, in part, to a political agenda that contributed
to its downfall.
After a historical background on Mexican fisheries, the
causes of the overall decline will be examined . Following an
in-depth look at each of the selected Mexican fisheries, some
pre-NAFTA political initiatives will be addressed. Next, the
effects of NAFTA on the environment and what effect these may
have on the marine environment will be examined . This will be
followed by proposed solutions to Mexico·s fishery problems .
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II. BACKGROUND
Mexico borders on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
Many species of marine life on the Pacific Ocean side are
sometimes affected by the El Nino/Southern Oscillation effect,
bringing some Southern Hemisphere and equatorial fisheries
farther north along the Mexican coast, occasionally reaching
the United States. The Pacific side has traditionally
accounted for over 80% of Mexico's yearly 1 .5 million metric
ton fish catch, with the majority of that, up until 1990,
coming from the Sea of Cortez (formerly called the Gulf of
California) (McGettigan, 1994). Of the fisheries to be
examined, sea turtles are common on both Atlantic and Pacific
coasts; while the remainder are primarily on the Pacific side.
Nearly all Mexican fish stocks are in some state of decline,
as evidenced in Table 1.
Before proceeding, it is important to realize some
economic and cultural differences between the United States
and Mexico. Mexico is still considered a third world country
with most of the population living in poverty. Fishing is not
only a means of making a living but provides a basic food
staple for all Mexicans living in the littorals. Without
premium education or even television,
4
the concept of
conservation is hardly understood by the average Mexican. If
told that a species of fish was nearing extinction or
destruction, a Mexican is apt to still catch and eat the last
one (Hendrickson, 1979)
TABLE 1 : DECREASE IN MEXICAN FISH POPULATIONS SINCE 1982
ZONE 1 ZONE 2 ZONE 3 ZONE 4 ZONE 5 AVERAGE
SOUTH LAPAZ LORET MIDRIF NORTH DECREASE
0 F
Yellowfin 60% 85% 85% n/a n/a 75%
Cabrilla* 80% 80% 80% 80% n/a 80%
Black Seabass* 95% 85% 85% 90% 90% 90%
Gulf Grouper* 85% 85% 85% 85% 80% 85%
White Seabass* n/a n/a n/a 80% 80% 80%
Yellowtail* 90% 100% 80% 80% 80% 85%
Manta Ray* 100% 100% 85% 7 7 100%
Striped Marlin 60% 70% 80% n/a n/a 70%
Blue Marlin 70% 70% 70% n/a n/a 70%
Roosterfish* 80% 95% 95% n/a n/a 90%
Sailfish 70% 70% 70% n/a n/a 70%
Amberjack 75% 75% 75% 7 n/a 75%
Dog Snapper* 80% 90% 80% 80% 80% 80%
Dorado 60% 60% 60% 60% 7 60%
Wahoo 75% 75% n/a n/a n/a 75%
Sierra* 85% 90% 90% n/a n/a 90%
Vaqueta* n/a n/a 75% 75% n/a 75%
Fish species shown with * are commercially extinct. The above information was taken
from the private U.S. environmental group SeaWatch, based on 17 years worth of
fishing and diving on the Pacific side on a daily basis.
It may seem logical to paint a picture of the typical
fisherman as money-driven and unconcerned about the state of
his fisheries. But, in fact, he is simply making a living and
probably providing food for his own family; his ignorance is
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not his fault but rather his government· s and indicative of
his way of life . UnemploYment benefits, quotas, subsidies, and
vessel buy-back are just a sample of many terms that a Mexican
fisherman is foreign to. The 1970s and 1980s saw a dramatic
increase in the number of Mexican fishermen and fishing boats
as the Mexicans realized just how profitable this mostly
untapped asset was, and catching fish to sell became a major
occupation for many Mexicans (Peterson, 1992).
There are several causes for the decline in Mexican fish
stocks. The oldest cause, albeit not the major reason, is
simply overfishing. The classic example of this is the Mexican
totoaba, a highly-prized species similar to white sea bass. As
late as the 1940·s, these 300 lb. fish were so plentiful that
author John Steinbeck wrote in Sea of Cortez, lithe entire sea
was a churning feeding frenzy of totoaba feeding off the
smaller fish, so numerous you could seemingly walk across the
water on their backs. II With no management plan to protect the
fishery, the totoaba is an endangered species today. It has
been literally fished out of existence (Lagomarsino, 1991).
This is true of many fish species on the Pacific side i the
overfishing of a highly-sought species causes the fisherman to
seek the next lower species . The Mexicans have engaged in this
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vicious cycle, systematically depleting fishery after fishery
over the past forty to fifty years. As in the United States ,
the advent of technological change has contributed to the
problem . Not all-inclusive are stronger nylon lines and nets,
fish-finding sonar, precise shipboard navigation systems,
computer-controlled trawling, and the use of IIfish factories,"
huge ships able to fish, clean, refrigerate or can large
quantities of fish while able to stay at sea for extended
periods of time .
The second cause for the fishery decline is the removal
of a basic food source , the sardine. Greenpeace activist
Matthew Gianni, in an interview with the Boston Globe, put it
best: "As the higher value stocks diminish, the fleets go
after lower value species. The danger is that lower value
species are often the very food stocks the higher fish need if
they are going to recover." From both the sportfishing and
cormnercial point of view, popular species such as cabrilla,
grouper, snapper , roosterfish, yellowtail and amberjack have
been depleted in such a manner (Zieralski, 1993). Mexican
fishermen then sought second class fish, such as chubs,
piernas, triggerfish, bonita and yellow pargo; and
subsequently depleted the stocks of these fish. In the early
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1980s, in a search for a fishery to be profitable, several
Mexican fishermen discovered the vast stocks of sardines in
the Pacific Ocean below and in the Sea of Cortez. The Sea of
Cortez, known for its cold, deep currents bringing nutrient-
rich water to the surface in a condition known as upwelling,
was a magnet for marine life. Sardines, the second link in the
marine food chain, would feed off the zooplankton and
phytoplankton attracted to the nutrients in the upwelling. The
mid 1980s saw sardines removed at the rate of 500,000 metric
tons per year (McGettigan, 1994). The Mexicans saw it as a
source for the manufacture of chicken feed, and a frenzy
developed between sardine trawlers (McGettigan, 1994) .
Eventually, the late 1980s saw the elimination of the sardine
fishery, and in turn, the decline of nearly every other fish
species in the Sea of Cortez (Kramer, 1994). The Mexicans had
succeeded in removing the basic link in the marine food chain
and therefore the small fish that bigger fish needed for food.
The plankton would always flourish due to the tidal-pumped
upwellings, but removal of the sardine food source effectively
halted the ability of large fish to feed off of smaller fish.
The third contributing factor to the demise of several
Mexican fisheries is the indiscriminate use of nets, whether
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used from large fishing vessels or from a simple fisherman's
panga. 1 The use of gill nets and shrimp nets has resulted in a
swept water column in the popular Pacific fishing areas and in
the Sea of Cortez. After sweeping the water column, nets would
be dragged on the bottom to get the bottom species. In the
1980s, there were 1000 to 1500 shrimp boats in the northern
Sea of Cortez, shrimping an area 150 miles long by 50-80 miles
wide (Kramer, 1994). The intensity of netting by a small panga
is illustrated in a 50 mile popular fishing corridor between
Monserrate Island and Punta Pulpito on the Pacific Ocean side.
In May 1993 there were between 200 and 250 pangas fishing. The
pangas had between 1-3 nets, some stretching 1800 feet long
but most about 1000 feet long, and capable of netting 3-5 tons
of fish per night (McGettigan, 1995) Sadly, the only fish
caught were large grouper and sharks (second class fish) but
were kept nonetheless. The existence of "ghost nets," nets
that have been lost or abandoned, will plague fish stocks
forever. The Revillagigedo Islands in the Pacific and reefs in
both the Pacific and Sea of Cortez are littered with ghost
lA panga is a 22 foot open fishing skiff, often with one or two
large outboard motors.
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nets, trapping live species and often resulting in slow deaths
(Figure 1) .
Mexican fishermen were led to
a net would save certain fish. Until
the mandatory use of turtle excluder
fishermen
shark nets,large mesh
(discussed later),
presumably to catch sharks, but instead
believe that changing the mesh size of
snag sea turtles. Until the mandated
would use
use of the turtle devices, using a
large mesh size is believed to have
devices
Figure
trapped in
"ghost" net.
been a guise for the actual catch of turtles (Walker, 1994).
The lack of a management plan and subsequent enforcement
certainly contributes to
it has been observed
the demise of Mexican
fish stocks. In Mexico,
inFigure
market
isresourcea
sufficiently depleted to
any time until it is
that
fished by any method, at
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be unprofitable, then it is abandoned (McGettigan, 1994). Bans
of varying degree have been placed on sardines, totoaba, tuna,
shrimp, marlin, lobster, clams, et.al. (Kramer, 1994) . A
biosphere reserve, designed to ban fishing in overfished
areas, was established in the northern Sea of Cortez in the
1990s (LaRue, 1993). But what good is a law when there is no
enforcement process in place to insure its success? The
Mexican Navy at Guaymas is responsible for enforcing the upper
Sea of Cortez. There is one Department of Fisheries inspector
responsible for the coastline between Santa Rosalia and La
Paz. There is one Mexican Navy boat to patrol the
Revillagigedo Islands a.n the Pacific, an old World War II
vintage patrol boat bought from the U.S. that can barely get
underway every two weeks for its regular "patrol" (Campbell,
1994). During a total ban on sea turtle catches by the Mexican
government, sea turtles continued to show up in the Sonora
fish market (Figure 2). Fishermen in San Francisquito Bay
openly admit they pay 5000 pesos (about $750) to the
Department of Fisheries representative to ignore all
infractions (McGettigan, 1994) .
During the summer of 1994, charter diver and commercial
photographer Steve Drogin financed a study that revealed what
11
many had suspected for years. The Department of Fisheries
cannot enforce the law. All fishermen he talked to thought all
fisheries officials took bribes, or mordida (Knudson, 1995).
The Department of Fisheries got out in the field only on token
trips for political reasons. When interviewed, the Fisheries
officials stated "Mexican fisheries are in good shape - the
few drop-offs are due to nature" (McGettigan, 1994). Enriqueta
Velarde, a professor at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de
Mexico and a frequent visitor to the Sea of Cortez in her
studies, says, "Fisheries inspectors go from fishing camp to
fishing camp, gathering bribes. They allow people to continue
to fish, whether they have a permit or not, as long as they
get their bribe" (Knudson, 1995). During a trip to the Baja
peninsula in July 1995, the author personally witnessed the
illegal shrimp trawling at night of protected Conception Bay
and the illegal taking of Catalina scallops by Mexican divers
using scuba gear. The scallop divers, standing in water no
deeper than 10 feet, would extract an embedded scallop, crack
the shell, remove and bag the marble-sized scallop meat, then
discard the scallop shell . Having air for at least two hours,
two Mexican divers could reap two bushels of scallop meat and
then sadly litter the ocean floor with literally hundreds of
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scallop shells. When asked after surfacing what they were
doing, they freely admitted that they were going to sell the
scallops to a village restaurant and were not worried that it
was an illegal activity because there was "no one to stop
them." The most startling revelation comes from the Department
of Fisheries inspector in Loreto, on the west side of the Sea
of Cortez: "I must take an occasional mordida (bribe), but
only so I can put gas in my (government -supplied) truck." The
inspector I s salary is $50 per week, and has no vessel to
patrol the waters (Knudson, 1995) .
Finally, it should be noted that in many Mexican fishing
villages education at any level is meager. The average Mexican
has little concept of the terms "conservation" and
"environment." Fish as source of the world I s food supply is
probably incomprehensible. There is no appreciation for
protecting natural resources because it is not taught in third
world secondary school systems. The advent of satellite
television may have more of an impact than any classroom
environment .
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III. SELECTED FISHERIES
CALIFORNIA GRAY WHALES
The first fishery to be examined is the California gray
whale. Every year 20,000 gray whales migrate almost 12,000
miles from the Bering Sea off Alaska to breeding and calving
areas off Mexico. They gather off the Baja California coast in
several lagoons (Figure 3) because of the warm water
temperatures, greater buoyancy caused by higher water
salinity, and the protection the lagoons offer from predators
(Sherman, 1995) . At the turn of the 20th century, commercial
whalers (such as the American explorer and whaler Scammon)
almost devastated the gray whale population. Whalers turned to
more profitable species because of the whale's scarcity. As
the whales started to return in population in the 1930s,
commercial whaling began to grow again. In 1946, the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
prohibited the commercial hunting of whales (Seasholes, 1994).
In 1988, under international pressure, the Mexican government
established the Vizcaino Desert Biosphere Reserve,
encompassing the lagoons, to protect the whales and other
marine life (LaRue, 1993).
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Figure 3 Gray whale breeding lagoons
miles south of San Diego, California.
in Baja California, 450
Earlier, in 1954, Compania Exportadora de Sal, a salt
company taking advantage of the high salinity of the lagoon
saltwater, began a salt extraction operation in Guerrero Negro
lagoon to the north . During the 13 years the company operated
there while dredging the lagoon, an Oregon State University
mammal research program determined the gray whale population
dropped dramatically (Darling, 1995). The salt company then
moved to the larger Ojo de Liebre lagoon, and expanded their
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operation that has made Mexico the second largest salt
exporter in the world (Morrison, 1995).
In early 1995, the salt company announced its intention
to expand its operations to the next lagoon to the south, San
Ignacio Lagoon. At that time, the Ojo de Liebre plant produced
six million tons of salt per year, and the proposed San
Ignacio expansion would increase capacity by more than seven
million tons (Aridjis, 1995). Additionally, the expansion
would create some 200 new jobs and bring in additional export
revenues (Darling, 1995) . It should be noted that Compania
Exportada de Sal is 51% owned by the Mexican government and
49% by Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan (Morrison, 1995).
What transpired last year in a purely political process
is the norm for Mexico environmentalism. The salt company
hired 11experts" to conduct an 11environmental impact
assessment. 11 This was merely a play on words, in one of
several attempts to placate both Mexican and u.S.
environmental groups that were slowly hearing of the salt
company's plans. The 465-page environmental impact assessment 2
2Th i s assessment was a free-form document, not to be confused
wi th the mandated format of U. S . assessments as required by the
U.S . National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
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concluded that there would be no adverse impact on the lagoon,
even though only 23 lines of the document addressed the impact
on the California gray whale (Aridj is, 1995) . The company
ignored the fact that pumping more than 6600 gallons of water
per minute out of the lagoon to extract salt would lower both
the salinity and temperature of the lagoon saltwater (Darling,
1995). In order to avoid the accusation of using economic
benefits to justify the loss of the gray whale I s breeding
habitat, the salt company merely insisted that the habitat
wouldn't be lost and the gray whales would be unaffected .
The current economic woes of Mexico appeared to be
bulldozing the few Mexican conservation and environmental
policies as peso-hungry politicians stepped to the front. Baja
California South Governor Guillermo Mercado expressed firm
support for the project and cited environmentalists' concerns
as "disinformation" (Darling, 1995) . A local mayor stated that
if the project was not allowed to continue, the salt company
would be forced to shut down, knowing that his city depended
on the company's existence. He objected to the "centralist
stances" that were being put up in order to "thwart economic
development" (Sherman, 1995) . In perhaps what would be
considered the worst in conflict of interest in the United
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States, the Mexican Secretary of Commerce fully endorsed the
project and began using his influence to sway agencies to lend
support. It was then revealed that the Commerce Secretary,
Herminia Blanco, is the President of the board of the salt
company. However, conflict of interest is so rampant in Mexico
that the local population thought nothing of the Secretary
using his position to benefit h is own personal interests
(Morrison, 1995).
In March 1995, the Mexican National Ecology Institute
rejected the company's proposal and disallowed the expansion,
largely as a result of the efforts of the private ecology
group Group of 100 in Mexico City and heavy press coverage in
the Los Angeles Times and The San Diego Union-Tribune (DaRosa,
1995). In a major victory over high-level government officials
suppressing environmental issues, the salt company's economic
goals will not be met. Whether this trade-off will spell doom
for the local and/or national economy remains to be seen, but
it established a precedent in the Mexican environmental arena.
What Mexican officials failed to do was also assess the
economic impact of the loss of several gray whale watching
companies that do business in the area . Whether by bus or by
airplane, tourists spend a great sum of money to travel to see
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the whales' spawning area (Rodgers, 1996), and herein lies the
potential problem: those companies operate from southern
California and the majority of the tourist dollars are pumped
back to the U.S. vice the local Mexican economy. Therefore,
one is led to question if the press interest generated was the
result of pressure by California excursion companies .
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PACIFIC MANTA RAYS
The giant Pacific manta ray has been known to the diving
community for years (Figure 4). Weighing up to 2000 pounds and
some having a wingspan of 25 feet across, the mantas are known
to give divers and snorkellers rides underwater, by the diver
gently grabbing the leading edge of the manta by its horns and
the manta gliding underwater. Costa Rica and Mexico have been
singled out by diving magazines as destinations to experience
manta riding (Campbell, 1994).
Mexico has all but decimated the Pacific manta, and with
it, the scuba diving business that this fish brought . The El
Bajo Seamount, located off La Paz in the Sea of Cortez, used
to teem with mantas as a result of the upwelling that took
place there. The manta started to disappear in the 1970s when
the Mexican fishermen began to take away the smaller food
sources of fish that the manta preyed on. Large quantities of
manta were also caught as bycatch in gillnets used to capture
shark (Eyeles, 1994) Fishermen would harpoon the mantas
several times before dumping them overboard, so "they won't
foul their nets again" (McGettigan, 1994). Lastly, in a
desperate act of needing some type of edible fish, Mexican
fishermen have been known to cut off the small part of meated
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wing of a manta and sellon the market. Not a particularly
tasty fish, twenty pounds of manta might bring $20 (Matthews,
1993) .
In February 1994, underwater photographer and diver
Terry Kennedy was anchored off the Revillagigedo Islands about
350 miles off the west Mexico coast in the Pacific Ocean. The
Revillagigedos are a series of underwater volcanos rising
abruptly from the ocean floor and a habitat for many species
of marine life, particularly giant mantas . Mexican law
prohibits any fishing activity within 12 miles of the island
chain. Kennedy witnessed and filmed a Mexican Department of
used personally by the
fishery official, laying
long lines and inshore
gill nets on reefs within
3 miles of the islands
Fisheries
(Campbell,
boat,
1994) .
being
When
the nets were pulled up,
two of the giant mantas were hopelessly tangled in the nets,
unable to free themselves and rendering the net useless. The
fishery official cut the net from his boat and the mantas
21
dropped in the water, monofilament net and all, to settle on
the underwater reef to die. The official then pulled up his
long lines and found nothing but reef sharks on the hooks; he
then cut the line above the hooks, dropping the sharks onto
the reef as well (McGettigan, 1994). It was not known what
species of fish the fishing boat was targeting, but an
underwater inspection of the reef revealed thousands of feet
of old net line and dozens of dead sharks. Later, a passing
manta was harpooned by the fishing boat and lifted with gaff
hooks to the side of the boat. Men in small boats then cut the
wings off the live mantas (Figure 5). In a matter of hours, 5
tons of fish were caught but only the near-useless manta wings
were kept (Campbell, 1994). Just like the decimation of the
mantas at EI Bajo seamount in the Sea of Cortez, a senseless
act to garner a few dollars at the fish market unknowingly
cost the Mexican economy unknown tourist dollars as the mantas
at Revillagigedo began to disappear.
Kennedy I s video was shown on CBS Evening News, CNN and
the Mexican equivalent of 60 Minutes, Al Despartar. Diving and
tourist magazines did stories on the killing. Internationally
embarrassed, Mexico President Carlos Salinas de Gortari made
it unlawful to kill a manta, enacted a $10, 000 penalty for
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anyone caught doing so, and put it on the "endangered species"
list. This action came at a time when the environmental accord
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was under
scrutiny by u.s. critics. Today, enforcement is all but non-
existent . The Mexican Navy patrol boat alluded to earlier to
protect and monitor the islands still gets underway once every
2 weeks, at a pre- set time. Enforcement is actually carried
out by private fishing and dive charters, who report violators
via radio to the Mexican authorities (McGettigan, 1994).
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SEA TURTLES
Sea turtles, which include Kemp's, olive Ridleys, green
and black varieties, are considered one of the most imperiled
creatures of the sea Kemp's turtles on the endangered
species list (Luoma, 1995). Sea turtles native to Mexican
waters include both Atlantic and Pacific species. Of the
marine species in decline in Mexico, the conservation efforts
aimed at sea turtles hold the most promise; but again,
enforcement is lax or non-existent. Some species that numbered
40,000 in the 1950s had plurrnneted to a few hundred in the
middle 1980s (Luoma, 1994). Conservation efforts by the United
States have helped save the sea turtle in Mexican waters. The
once-abundant sea turtle has faced two major threats:
entanglement in the nets of shrimp trawlers and t he rampant
poaching of sea turtle eggs on Mexican beaches. Sea turtle
meat, particularly the green, is arguably the most delicious,
due to the green being a vegetarian that grazes the pastures
of sea grasses and algae (Darosa, 1994).
Male and female sea turtles mate offshore, and females
come onshore to nest . Genetic tests suggest that the
aforementioned sea turtles may only nest on the beach they
were born (Darosa, 1994). Each female lays up to six clutches
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of eggs, at ten to twelve day intervals, with about 100 golf
ball-sized eggs in each clutch. Next there is a 60 day
incubation period, where the eggs are subject to an array of
natural threats: destruction by rain or sea water or eaten by
birds, crabs, dogs or raccoons. Hatchlings that survive to
break out of their shells and return to the sea face new
predators in the underwater environment . Only a few from each
thousand eggs make it to adulthood.
The Mexican shrimp trawler fleet, aggressively combing
both Atlantic and Pacific waters, have a long history of
entrapping sea turtles in the shrimp nets. In U.S . waters, the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) mandated the use of
turtle excluder devices, a type of "escape hatch" in the net
that ejects large objects, including turtles, from the throat
of the sock-shaped trawling net (Dept . of State, 1994). In
1993, Mexican authorities mandated the use of the devices on
their own shrimp vessels. Mexican fishermen quickly learned
what their American counterparts knew: the devices ej ect a
number of shrimp as well. Both American and Mexican shrimpers
purposely installed the devices incorrectly, some with the
device door sewn shut, in an attempt to circumvent the
regulations . In Mexico, the shrimpers were more blatant by
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simply not installing the devices at all, knowing that
enforcement was nearly non-existent (Luoma, 1994). During the
summer of 1994, 350 dead Kemp I s sea turtles washed ashore
along the Texas-Mexico border in the Gulf of Mexico, apparent
victims of net entanglement. The U.S. Coast Guard, after being
sued by the Center for Marine Conservation, began aggressively
monitoring and enforcing the exclusion device regulation in
U.S. waters (Walker, 1994). Nothing happened on the part of
the Mexican government. In a March, 1994 U. S. Department of
State Dispatch , the government of Mexico reports that since it
implemented its mandatory turtle excluder device law, it has
not granted any commercial shrimp trawlers permission to fish
unless "proper installation of approved devices has been
verified by Mexican authorities." Again, the verification is
non-existent (Lindquist, 1994).
Poaching has also decimated the sea turtle population.
In addition to the turtle meat being sold as a delicacy in
restaurants, sea turtle products such as sea turtle-skin
boots, creams, and shell products made up an impressive trade.
The eggs themselves are considered an aphrodisiac in some
Latin American countries and China, and could garner as much
as $5 an egg in the black market (Fu, 1993).
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In 1990, Mexico outlawed trade in sea turtle products in
accordance with the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES). But a loophole allowed Mexican
vendors to sell off their "pre-1990 inventory," without
provision to determine when the sea turtle product was made.
Inspection was so lax that most vendors were unaware that the
trade had been declared illegal (Steiner, 1994). As part of a
NAFTA debate in 1993, Mexican President Salinas assured the
U.S . that the Mexican government would act against the illegal
trade this too has turned into a false promise to push
NAFTA. In November 1994, the Sierra Club and Earth Island
Institute filed suit against the U.S. Secretaries of Interior
and Commerce to force them to stop the slaughter and
trafficking in endangered sea turtles in Mexico; specifically,
require nations importing shrimp into the United States to
reduce their turtle immortality (Walker, 1994). The 1978 Pelly
Amendment requires investigation of charges that other nations
are failing to enforce treaties protecting endangered species.
The U. S . President could ultimately impose trade sanctions
against Mexico, but the timing could not have been worse: in
December 1994, the peso was seriously devaluated and the U.S.
embarked on a plan to bailout the Mexican economy. The
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lawsuit has stagnated and the U.S. government is seeking
dismissal of the suit, claiming Earth Island Institute lacks
authority to request the embargo (Walker, 1994). Had it
progressed, the economic ramifications would have been a
disaster for Mexico . A shrimp embargo against Mexico would
have been considerably worse than the tuna embargo Earth
Island Institute spearheaded years earlier due to the
thousands of dolphins Mexico was killing in its tuna catch .
The value of Mexican shrimp sales totalled $1.7 billion for
1991 - tuna sales before the tuna embargo were $800 million
(Lindquist, 1994) . If the Mexican economy had not crashed in
1994, it is questionable that the U.S. government would have
allowed such drastic economic measures against Mexico.
However, there is a positive outlook concerning the sea
turtles. Surprisingly, it has been the efforts of private
citizens, scientists and environmental groups that have begun
to rebuild the sea turtle population. The Sierra Club,
Caribbean Conservation Corporation, Earth Island Institute and
the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service have contributed to this
effort (Fitzsimmons, 1992) .
In the Mexican state of Michoacan lie beaches where
Kemp's and black sea turtles return to nest. Conservationists
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and scientists voluntarily patrol the beaches during the
nesting season and track the female turtles until they lay
their eggs. The eggs are immediately dug up and then
sequestered in protected coral on the beach and guarded for
the nearly 2 months until they hatch. Whether the prey is
natural or a poacher, the eggs are being protected by a
respectable international effort, and the turtle numbers
appear to be rising (Luoma, 1994). A recent classified ad in
the San Diego Union-Tribune recruited volunteers for the
turtle project in Mexico, Costa Rica and Nicaragua.
Interestingly, the scientists have considered human needs as
well. They are developing alternate sources of income for
local residents who used to rely on the turtles. Eco-tourism
and sales of handicrafts have replaced turtle hunting,
particularly among the Mexican Indians (Steiner, 1994).
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TOTOABA
The demise of the totoaba fishery is a classic example
of Mexican inattention, mismanagement and lack of enforcement
of a treasured and valuable marine natural resource. The
totoaba is similar to the Pacific white sea bass and at one
time one of the more tasty fish species found in both Mexican
and u.s. seafood restaurants (Hendrickson, 1979). Weighing up
to 300 pounds and as large as six feet long, the totoaba was
also an excellent sportfish, often providing anglers
excitement and challenge in landing one of these aggressive
giants. A combination of overfishing, habitat alteration and
bycatch reduced the totoaba population to qualify as an
endangered species in 1979 (NMFS, 1979). In the past three
years, there have been no known documented totoaba catches and
it is feared the species may be extinct (Lagomarsino,
pers.comm. 1996)
As early as 1940, Mexican authorities recognized the
rapidly declining numbers of totoaba and implemented totoaba
fishing seasons as early as 1955 (Alvarez-Borrego, 1983). The
totoaba was particularly exploitable because of its natural
confinement to the northern half of the Sea of Cortez and its
proven annual breeding migration every February to the mouth
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of the Colorado River . So proven, ln fact, that adult totoaba
were naturally funneled into a small area to lay their eggs,
where fishermen waited in numbers (Flanagan and Hendrickson,
1976). As late as the 1950s, a thousand or more totoaba would
trap schools of smaller fish against the shore, chase them and
eat them, thrashing the water into a "frenzied foam" (Cannon,
1966) . With the established totoaba fishing seasons largely
ignored, fishermen continued to illegally fish to satisfy,
oddly enough, a large U.S. restaurant market willing to pay
top dollar for the tasty fish (Lagomarsino, 1991). With no
monitoring or enforcement mechanisms in place, seasons were
ignored because "everyone else ignored them" (Seibert, 1994).
The agency responsible for enforcement was the Mexican Navy
250 miles south in the port city of Guaymas, who rarely
ventured north (McGettigan, 1994). Because of a lack of
enforcement, it was not uncommon for fishermen to "domino ,"
whereas if one fishing vessel was seen to be fishing, several
would join. In 1976, the Mexican government placed a
moratorium on all totoaba fishing, but again, was ignored by
Sea of Cortez fishermen because of lack of enforcement. Due to
environmental pressure from the United States, Mexican
President Salinas enacted strict prison sentences in 1991 for
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anyone illegally catching a totoaba (Lagomarsino, 1991). In
1992, large-mesh gillnets were banned in the northern Sea of
Cortez, commonly used to catch totoaba. Whether the Mexican
government's actions were timely enough is immaterial : with no
means of monitoring and enforcing the Mexican regulations,
Mexican fishermen continued to fish .
As a sidelight, a seemingly unrelated event may have
also contributed to the loss of the totoaba. As the U.S . built
dams on the Colorado River and as the Colorado's fresh water
was diverted to agricultural projects and farms in the
Coachella and Mexicali Valleys in California and Mexico,
respectively, the flow of fresh water into the Sea of Cortez
came to a standstill . The point at which the Colorado River
flowed into the Cortez is coincidentally the site of the
totoaba breeding ground. Scientists have theorized that the
combination of salt water and fresh water, coupled with the
right sediment mix from the Colorado River, produced the right
"nursery conditions" for the totoaba eggs to hatch and the
hatchlings to mature (Arvizu and Chavez, 1972)
Lastly, the totoaba was a victim of two sources of
incidental bycatch. Shrimp trawlers, aggressively combing the
northern gulf for shrimp in the same area as the totoaba
32
breeding ground, often caught juvenile totoaba in their nets .
The ratio of bycatch to useable shrimp was placed at 10: 1
(McGettigan, 1994). The breeding area was designated as a
protective sanctuary in 1975. The 1980s saw a further
reduction of totoaba stocks when adult totoaba, now considered
an endangered species, were incidentally caught in the nets
being set for shark. Because of a lucrative black market for
totoaba, it has been suggested that totoaba was really the
target species (Lagomarsino, 1991).
In 1991, two scientific centers were established in
Sonora, Mexico to research ways to raise totoaba in captivity .
Promised funding from the Salinas government never material-
ized and research on the part of Mexico is stalled
(Lagomarsino, pers. comm. 1996).
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SHARKS AND CLAMS
Two fisheries that will not be examined but only
mentioned due to their senseless and agressive over f i s h i ng are
those of the shark and chocolate clam . The decimation of the
shark fishery is a world-wide problem, not inherent to Mexico.
However, the search for more and more species and fisheries to
sustain Mexican fishermen's quest for a market eventually led
to the shark . Dried shark fins bring about $40 a kilo in the
Ensenada, Mexico fish market (Matthews, 1994). Particularly in
the Sea of Cortez, fishermen set their nets for schooling
hammerhead sharks, which are brought aboard a vessel,
"finned," and then the shark carcass is thrown back into the
sea . The Chinese purchased 6600 million pounds of dried shark
fins in 1990 (Gruber, 1993). Because the marine food chain
has been disrupted in the Sea of Cortez, hammerheads have been
seriously reduced there (McGettigan, 1994). Still, about 200
boats per night visit the Midriff Islands with night gillnets
to try and net any remaining hammerheads. Over 40% of the
shark catch is pregnant females. To make matters worse,
Mexican fishermen are killing sea lions and porpoises to bait
the sharks, as mammal blood attracts sharks better than fish
blood (McGettigan, 1994).
34
In the sununer
of students from a
ecology class was
of 1994, a group
of
marine
permitted to ride
University
Arizona
fishing activities
Figure 5 Giant
about to be
fishermen.
manta, gaffed on hooks,
slaughtered by Mexican
and observe the
on an 80 foot Mexican shrimp boat out of Puerto Penasco on the
eastern shore of the Sea of Cortez at night . The vessel laid a
9000 ft. gill net (12 inch mesh size), primarily for sharks.
Twice during the night, giant mantas had to be removed from
the net, as they weighted the net down. When the net was
retrieved the next morning, the catch was as follows:
11 bigeye and conunon thresher sharks
5 hanunerhead sharks
1 dusky shark
14 sailfish
1 black marlin
2 manta rays
74 skipjacks
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After the net was completely retrieved, the sharks were
"finned," and the jaws removed. The aspect that is most
disturbing is the waste of non-target species. None of the
sailfish, marlin, mantas or skipj acks were saved, they were
thrown back overboard dead without any attempt to salvage the
meat. When the crew was asked why they were not utilizing
these fishes , their answers were simple: they did not have
enough space or ice to store "inferior" species (data and
background provided by Alex Kerstich and Dr. Don Thompson,
University of Arizona). The fishermen related that this was a
"typical" catch, that in recent years overall harvests had
been seriously declining.
A delicacy in Baja California restaurants has long been
the chocolate, or chocolata clam. In 1991 , a chocolata rage
struck Mexico City restaurants and public ads were placed in
Mexican newspapers offering good prices for the clams. A fleet
of pangas and hooka divers descended on Bahia Concepcion in
the Sea of Cortez. Each panga could take half a ton of clams
per day, and the average monthly take in Bahia Concepcion was
350,000 clams. In less than a month, the bay was depleted of
chocolate clams. The panga fleet then headed to other bays, in
somewhat of a "corrunercial strip mining" of chocolate clams.
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The only environmental criteria used was, when there was
nothing left, it was time to quit (McGettigan, 1994)
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IV. NAFTA: POLITICS OF MEXICAN MARINE CONSERVATION
Controversy over its potential environmental effects
dogged the passage of the North American Free Tr ade Agr eement
(NAFTA). Environmental groups were concerned that the treaty
would bring u.s. and Canadian environmental standards down to
notorious Mexican levels. Growing industrialization caused by
NAFTA could worsen Mexico's already poor public services, such
as water supplies, sewage treatment, solid waste disposal and
air quality. President Clinton, given his strong stand on the
environment, placed enormous pressure on Mexican President
Salinas to raise the level of Mexico's environmental
standards. Salinas made an impressionable attempt to tie
marine conservation with NAFTA, which will be discussed
shortly. Since the passage of NAFTA in November 1993, however,
direct effects on marine conservation have been largely
unheard of. Instead , other environmental issues have been
exacerbated. It is important to examine how those issues are
being dealt with, because of the strong likelihood that later
marine environmental issues may be handled in a similar
fashion.
38
"MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM" AS A PRECURSOR TO NAFTA
Longliner Issue.
In 1990, the United States enacted a tuna embargo
against Mexico because Mexican tuna seiners were not using
fishing techniques that were considered "dolphin safe"
(Zieralski, 1993). As a result, the tuna fishing industry in
Mexico went near-bankrupt, and the Mexican government
considered issuing longline permits to 10 to 12 Japanese
fishing vessels that would allow the Japanese to fish within
Mexico I s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 miles on the
Pacific Ocean side but no closer than 50 miles. The Japanese
longliners were known to set some 2500 hooks a day on lines
that stretched 60 miles, and could catch in one fishing trip
what an eight -boat sportfishing charter could catch in two
years . La Paz fishermen estimate these Japanese "fish
factories" could haul in 4800 marlin per trip (Zieralski,
1993) .
When news of the permit contemplation broke out (due to
exposure by an English-language newspaper in Baja California) ,
sport-fishing charters, Mexican fishing co-ops and
environmentalists protested to the government and President
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Salinas . In early 1993, Salinas ordered a delay in the
issuance of any permits for one year to further study the
impact . Shortly thereafter, a Japanese-operated longliner was
confiscated within the Mexican EEZ for taking 80 tons of
marlin, 20 tons of yellowfin tuna, two tons of filleted
swordfish and two tons of shark species taken
indiscriminately (Zieralski, 1993).
The case against the longliners was supposedly strong .
However, what occurred next typifies Mexican politics: in the
next year, six Japanese longliners (who had previously applied
for the EEZ permits) showed up in Mexican waters fishing under
Mexican flag (McGettigan, 1994). The Mexican government had
sold out its own people - rather than refuse the Japanese (and
the income generated by the foreign longliner permits), the
government simply re-flagged the vessels! One can only imagine
the monetary compensation that passed in order for this to
happen. Was it a coincidence that Salinas ordered the delay in
the permit issuance to the Japanese because NAFTA was being
debated, and subsequently enacted in November 1993? Was the
re-flagging done quietly and specifically after the passage of
NAFTA? Salinas attempted to pacify both businessmen and
environmentalists, and his timing was excellent .
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Mexican Biospheres.
In June, 1993 Mexican President Salinas established a
"biosphere" reserve in the north Sea of Cortez. The reserve
established a 3700 square mile sanctuary for marine life
stretching from San Felipe on the east coast of Baja
California to Puerto Penasco on the west coast of mainland
Mexico. The preserve places a vast area of the upper gulf off-
limits to commercial fishing, sport fishing and oil drillingj
and hopefully will protect the spawning grounds of the
endangered totoaba fish and vaquita dolphin. The vaquita is
often trapped in the gill nets set by fishermen legally
fishing for shark and other species and illegally fishing for
totoaba in the northern gulfj while the fishermen are laying
their nets in known areas of the Gulf where migrating totoaba
are known to frequent (Hendrickson, 1979). Additionally, the
shrimp trawlers have sharply reduced the shrimp population in
the northern gulf.
The demise of the vaquita and totoaba and the reduction
of shrimp stocks in the Sea of Cortez had been known for some
time prior to 1993 . Salinas' move to declare the preserve in
an attempt to save these species presented him with an
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opportunity to demonstrate his concern about environmental
issues as parallel agreements to NAFTA were being negotiated.
AU. S . National Marine Fisheries Service official stated, "I
think Mexico is concerned about the environment, but we also
know that one of the sticking points with NAFTA is
environmental issues" (Walker, 1993).
Was Salinas really concerned about saving these fish, or
was he pushing NAFTA? The vaquita and totoaba had been
declared nearly extinct in the mid 1970s, and Mexican shrimp
boats had long overfished the northern gulf, and had moved
their nets considerably farther south (Larue, 1993). At the
time, and even today, there was no monitoring effort or
enforcement plan in effect to protect the "biosphere ." Salinas
announced that the Mexican Navy would patrol the area, but
from a naval base 300 miles south in Guaymas. There are
currently no Mexican patrol boats in the northern gulf
(Lagomarsino, pers.comm., 1996)
Instead, Mexican officials trumpeted the President's
action with rhetoric and fanfare, such as "this will protect
Mex.i.co t s heritage, a stunning heritage - it·s an incredibly
valuable move to protect the unique habitat of the northern
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Gulf of California" (Walker, 1993) and "we have decided that
here ecology has priority over politics" (Larue, 1993).
U.S. environmental groups politely applauded Salinas'
actions, but realize it falls well short of real environmental
concern. Concurrent with the biosphere establishment,
Defenders of Wildlife conducted radio and television ads in
Mexico in an attempt to increase public awareness of the true
status of the northern gulf. The only enforcement visible was
that of NMFS' special agents verifying fish imports at select
U.S.-Mexican border crossings (Walker, 1993) .
Salinas took advantage of many issues that could have
swayed the U.S. decision on NAFTA and attempted to show that
Mexico was concerned about marine conservation, but only when
the issue arose. The salt factory expansion at the Guerrero
Negro whale breeding grounds would have been a boon for the
Mexican economy, but risking bad publicity and possible non-
passage of NAFTA, Salinas sided with the environmentalists. By
the same token, the sea turtle issue was raised at the same
time NAFTA arguments were being made, and Salinas pushed the
mandated use of TEDs in Mexico, presumably to show his support
for environmentalism . Again, monitoring and enforcement in the
Gulf of Mexico was nearly non-existent. The slaughter of the
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giant mantas was an embarrassment for Salinas and he promptly
enacted laws to punish any offenders, despite his lack of
enforcement resources in the Pacific. The Japanese longliner
issue is a travesty to the Mexican people, and Salinas'
biosphere reserve establishment was an attempt to be
proactive; but as previously mentioned, the biosphere was
established and laws passed with no mechanisms in place to
monitor and enforce . It is easy to see in hindsight that
passage of new laws and regulations that could not be
enforced, or initiatives and research (e.g. contemplated
totoaba research) that were announced but never enacted were
rhetoric to convince the u.S. that Mexico was pro-environment
and push the passage of NAFTA .
As a sidelight, the real intentions of Salinas have now
come under scrutiny as well . After stepping down as President
in December 1994, Mexico's economic woes may have been
worsened by more than just the peso devaluation. Salinas has
now been accused of embezzling some $84 million from the
Mexican government, in addition to charges of fraud, money
laundering and drug trafficking. In his obsessive quest to
head the World Trade Organization, which he could not do if
NAFTA was not passed in the U. S., Salinas falsely impressed
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both Americans and Mexicans that environmentalism was a major
agenda for his administration. Salinas now resides in Cuba
(Walker I 1996).
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POST-NAFTA ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Unfortunately, natural resource protection and marine
conservation are not addressed in the NAFTA environmental side
accord (Dept. of Commerce, 1993). However, certain parallels
and assumptions can be made based on what action/inaction is
conducted on the growing industrial complex generated as a
result of NAFTA , which will be addressed shortly. Marine
environmental issues share an important commonality with many
of Mexico's other environmental problems: the government
attacks problems one by one, and only after public outcry or
they have reached the critical stage or the point of no
return.
It is important to examine how environmental issues were
to be dealt with after the passage of NAFTA. The U.S., Canada
and Mexico met in 1993 and signed the NAFTA environmental side
accord, properly known as the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). NAAEC establishes a means
of monitoring and addressing environmental issues due to
effects of NAFTA-induced trade and industrialization,
particularly water quality, air quality, sewage and hazardous
waste disposal (Nader, 1995). The environmental agency is
called the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and
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is made up from representatives from the U.S ., Canada, and
Mexico. Additionally, the U.S. and Mexico created the Border
Integrated Environmental Plan (BIEP). One of the functions of
BIEP would be for the U.S. to train Mexican federal inspectors
and create a regional network of environmental workers
(Sanchez, 1993).
Although well-intentioned when established, the CEC does
not have the "policeman" status it should have. When
established, National Wildlife Federation and Environmental
Defense Fund recommended CEC should have an annual budget
between $30 million and $70 million. Their current budget is
$9 million (Nader, 1995). As the Commission currently stands,
there are too many restrictions on what they may investigate,
they have no power to investigate on their own, and there are
no provisions to prevent conflict of interest on the part of
Commission members (Nader, 1995). The CEC has turned into an
ineffective environmental overseer, not a condition that was
desired after the pro-environment positions of the U. S. and
Canada. Its ineffectiveness is evidenced by the continued
environmental abuse seen in the U. S . - Mexico border areas.
Although the Clinton Administration said in 1993 that NAFTA
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would cause the rnaqu i.Ladoras ' to dissipate into the Mexico
interior, the majority are still crowded around the border
towns and have experienced a 20% increase in growth since
NAFTA was passed (Collier, 1995). The major maquiladora areas
all report greater environmental problems now than pre-NAFTA:
air quality and sewage in Tijuana/San Diego ; air quality,
water quality and hazardous waste dumping in EI Paso/Ciudad
Juarez; untreated sewage in Laredo, TX/Laredo, Nogales,
AZ/Nogales and the Rio Grande River south of EI Paso; and
water quality problems in Del Rio, TX/Ciudad Acuna (Nader,
1995). Some of the reasons for CEC's inability to take action
have been mentioned, but the continued devaluation of the peso
(and subsequent failure to free funding for environmental
purposes by the Mexican government), coupled with the U. S.
Congress' own funding cut for environmental purposes, spells
doom for these industrial border areas (DePalma, 1995).
The NAAEC was supposed to have provided new financing
for environmental clean-up (Nader, 1995) . Funds never
materialized, and in order for Mexico to buy clean-up
equipment, it must be imported. This translates into a 50%
3Ma qui l a d or a s are the industrial factories, employing Mexican
labor, that exist only for exported products.
48
price increase of equipment as of late 1995 due to the 50%
peso devaluation since 1993 (Nader, 1995). The Mexicans simply
cannot afford it. Despite a bail-out attempt by the U. s.
government in 1995 (DePalma, 1995), the peso devaluation has
resulted in the inability of Mexican federal, state and local
governments to fund environmental clean-ups and regulate the
maquiladora industry.
The first test of a wildlife-related NAFTA issue (and
the only environmental issue the CEC has investigated)
involved the killing of thousands of migrating birds at a lake
in central Mexico called Silva Reservoir (Nauman, 1995). The
lake had become a dumping area for the national oil company
PEMEX and several industries that, among other hazardous
wastes, were dumping DDT and chemicals indiscriminately. The
Group of LOt), the Mexican environmental group who actively
protested the salt company expansion in Guererro Negro, again
brought the issue to light and with other non-government
organizations (NGOs) filed a petition with the CEC to
determine the cause and stop the dumping. A Mexican team of
inspectors under the CEC reported the cause of the bird
killings to be botulism. The Group of 100 protested; and
accused the CEC and Mexican government of downplaying the
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toxins that were industrially dumped (and verified by
independent scientists), in order to exonerate the factories
(Nader, 1995). This is a case of the Mexican government bowing
to pressure from environmentalists and allowing the NAFTA-
mandated investigation; but fabricating an unrelated cause to
prevent factory shutdown .
Is this an indication to how a fishery problem or marine
environmental issue will be handled? Marine natural resources
have thus far avoided the decreasing environmental standards
seen in the border cities or in an incident similar to Silva
Reservoir. But the message is disconcerting. Despite the
rhetoric that was presented by Mexico before the passage of
NAFTA, the Mexican government cannot tend to marine
environmental problems, especially on the scale that it is
facing in terms of air and water quality, sewage treatment and
hazardous waste dumping, whether generated by NAFTA or not .
Serious action on the part of the Mexican government dealing
with fisheries or marine resources should not be expected .
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v. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Mexican government currently faces grave national
economic problems. Economic recommendations will not be
addressed here, but specific initiatives are suggested to
improve the state of Mexican fisheries . Comment on the
likelihood of success will be made shortly.
Remove ALL nets from the Sea of Cortez. Although this
body of water encompasses only 5% of Mexico I s total waters
within the 200 mile limit, it has historically accounted for
75% of all fish taken in Mexican waters (McGettigan, 1995).
Nearly every fishery that occupies the Cortez has been
significantly reduced, and indiscriminate use of nets is one
of the catastrophic reasons . The net removal must be targeted
at the small, panga fisherman in addition to the commercial
industry . These pangas, numbering in excess of 3000, have
contributed to the fisheries decline. It is pointless to enact
a regulation on what a fisherman can or cannot fish for with
gill nets: enforcement is so weak that a TOTAL ban is
necessary. Trying to determine what legal fish a gillnetter is
seeking based on mesh size, size of nets, etc. is too
difficult . The total ban would serve several purposes : halt
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the illegal taking of species, reduce incidental bycatch,
bring the Cortez' fishing stocks back up, and make enforcement
easier, since the mere presence of nets would indicate illegal
fishing.
The sardine fishery must be re-established and
protected. It is critical to maintain the sardine fishery in
all Mexican waters. The sardine is the one link in the marine
food chain that can bring the large fish back.
Assist the Mexicans in education processes. The U. S.
government, non-government organizations (NGOs), and other
marine environmental groups can assist Mexico in education
programs aimed to acquaint the Mexican population with
conservation methods and techniques. This can be done at the
secondary school level, village or fishing co-op level, as
well as national television exposure. NMFS Southwest Region
has printed English and Spanish handouts describing the
dilemma of the totoaba and vaquita. It has been mentioned that
Defenders of Wildlife have run radio and television ads. The
Discovery Channel did a series on marine ecology issues and
ran the program in Spanish on Mexican TV. Several NGOs are
voluntarily patrolling the Revillagigedo Islands to stop the
manta killings and others are patrolling the sea turtle
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nesting beaches in the Gulf of Mexico. The private group
Seawatch distributed 3000 copies of its First Annual Report on
the Health of the Sea of Cortez to Mexican local, state and
government officials, as well as fishermen in major fishing
ports. The Mexican Group of 100 stages plays in Mexico City to
demonstrate environmental issues (Aridjis, 1995).
Assist the Mexicans in developing management plans. The
U.S. can assist the Mexican Department of Fisheries with
developing marine management plans, of which are nearly non-
existent today. Fishing seasons, quotas, limits, licensing and
moni toring are a few initiatives that could be taught to
Mexican officials.
Put mechanisms in place for the enforcement of existing
fishery laws and regulations. This will be extremely
difficult, and an undertaking the Mexican government must
devote assets to. It is easy to task the military to enforce
an area, but if the patrol boat is in repair or if there is no
fuel for the boat, the tasking is meaningless. The enforcement
resources, whether they are fisheries or military officials,
must be plentiful, honest and genuine if enforcement is to be
a success . The historical corruptness of officials and police
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is a difficult obstacle to overcome in a country where it has
been the norm for some period of time.
Assist the Mexicans in developing alternate sources of
employment . Indians who used to catch sea turtles in the Gulf
of Mexico have been re-trained to use the turtles as an eco-
tourism resource, developing employment related to sea turtle
watching and thereby drawing tourists and tourist dollars to
the area. This could be done in the scuba diving sites and sea
kayaking areas as well. In the shrimp village of Puerto
Penasco, for example, the shrimpers could be re-trained in
taking business advantage of the huge influx of Arizona
vacationers that frequent the area.
Continue research in maricultural projects. Although
research funding for the totoaba hatchery never materialized,
Hubbs-Sea World Research Institute in conjunction with San
Diego Gas and Electric Company have started a hatchery for
white sea bass in Carlsbad, California. Although the initial
return of the hatchlings is quite low (only 2500 of the first
lOa, 000 hatchlings are expected to survive one year), it is
the beginning of a revolutionary means of re-introducing
depleted species. Since the white sea bass is similar to
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totoaba, there is hope that technology gained from the u. S.
project may help develop a totoaba hatchery (Bigelow, 1994).
Allow local communi ties to manage their own resources.
The Mexican city of Loreto has petitioned the Mexican federal
government to give it municipal maritime jurisdiction on an
eighty mile long "preserve" that would straddle the city on
the Sea of Cortez. The city is concerned over federal
incompetence and mismanagement, and has seen its commercial
fishing, sportfishing and dive industries decline as a result
of the decimated fisheries. The city desires to manage,
regulate, license, monitor and enforce all activities within
this zone. It will include re-planting clam beds, regulate
fishing licenses, beach clean-ups and self-policing. If the
federal government approves of the plan, it will set a
precedent (Aparicio, 1995) .
Enlarge the Border Integrated Environmental Plan (BIEP).
As part of the NAFTA accord, this program was designed to
allow u.S. inspectors to train their Mexican counterparts in
areas of management and conservation. NMFS has successfully
done this with TED implementation, but enforcement is lacking.
Fisheries biologists from NMFS could be training Mexican
officials in all aspects of marine ecosystem management. The
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major stumbling block is that the Mexican government cannot
afford to add scientists, biologists or fisheries officials to
its payrolls. This is an area where U.S . funds or help from
NGOs may assist.
The U.S. Congress must take action. Congress must demand
withdrawal or re-negotiation of NAFTA if environmental
conditions worsen. A NAFTA transaction tax could be added to
help fund environmental clean-ups. This is necessary so the
lack of action in the poor industrial environment worsened by
NAFTA does not have the same effect and domino into the marine
environment.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A maj or concept that the Mexican government, and to a
minor extent the Mexican people, have failed to grasp is that
they have destroyed the very resource that provides them their
livelihood; not just the actual fisheries they have decimated,
but the economic benefits that the associated tourism could
bring . Dive shops and sportf ishing charters in La Paz and
Loreto have seen steadily decreasing business as a result of
the shrinking marine life. In the Sea of Cortez, for example,
there are no more mantas to ride, hammerhead sharks to swim
with, or unlimited numbers of gamefish for anglers. There is
some good news, however: there has been an increase of whale-
watching, sea turtle watching and sea kayaking tours ("eco-
tourism") originated by U.S. businesses, but these too are in
jeopardy because of the mismanagement of Mexico's marine
resources. There in lies a major point: if an issue is raised
that affects American businesses or American tourist dollars,
the protests are loudest. Therefore, U.S. initiatives are
required to protect Mexico's marine resources .
The current disarray of the Mexican economy presents a
bleak picture on whether the Mexicans can save their marine
resources on their own. Of the aforementioned recommendations,
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those that must totally rely on Mexican assets to implement
will be regrettably unable to achieve. By the same token,
those reconunendations that require more financial assistance
in areas of increased personnel (larger payroll) or research
and development will unlikely see success. As unfortunate as
it appears, the Mexican government, in its present state of
economic stress, corruptness, lack of direction and double
standards, is unable to attain a level of marine conservation
and environmental protection of its rich marine resources.
However, those areas where assistance or public outcry
originates from the U.S. government, NGOs, and private
citizens stand a fair chance of success. Public participation
will be mandatory for resources like the Sea of Cortez to not
become the next "dead sea." Letting government officials know
of the public I s concerns and having the public speak out
loudly, coupled with pressure from NGOs will be key in order
to stop the devastation. NGOs have been highly instrumental in
the publ Lc education process. Other actions holding promise
include an environmental transaction tax on NAFTA trade,
enlarging the BIEP, assistance in the education process and
encouraging the "self policing" that the Baj a city of Loreto
is proposing.
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Bottom line is that it is unlikely that Mexico will
recover from the destruction of its marine resources.
Finally, in a television documentary Mirage of the Sea
that Jacques Cousteau produced for TBS in 1993, he listed the
Sea of Cortez as one of the top three waters that had been
fished to devastation. This ultimately leads to a much larger
problem that Cousteau had no solution for: it is the dramatic
and rampant increase in the world's population that drives the
demand for fish, a most valuable food source. Since 1950, the
world I s total catch has grown from 20 million tons to just
under 100 million tons (Laurence, 1993). By using the United
Nations as a forum, it is imperative to address the population
growth of our planet and how it is affecting the world's food
supplies. This is the ultimate long term issue that the world
must come to grips with.
"No ecological problem will ever be solved until it becomes a
political problem and it will never became a political problem
until public opinion demands it." Paul Armand.
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